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Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavior
is therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to
rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative
reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined applica-
tion of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game,
where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth
strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise
to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession.
Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent
fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high
complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic
parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common
and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human
cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevX.3.041021 Subject Areas: Complex Systems, Interdisciplinary Physics,
Statistical Physics
I. INTRODUCTION
Humans havemastered the art of cooperation like no other
species [1,2]. Regardless of kinship and individual loss, we
work together to achieve feats that are impossible to achieve
alone. We have developed a very keen sense of fairness to
uphold cooperative behavior in our societies [3,4], and we
frequently punish those that do not cooperate in the pursuit of
personal benefits and elevated status [5–7]. There also exists
evidence that common marmosets and chimpanzees show
similar preferences regarding altruism and reward division
[8,9], suggesting a long evolutionary history to the human
sense of fairness.Although the origins of this behavior are not
fully understood, there exists evidence for between-group
conflicts [10] and provisioning for someone else’s young [11]
as viable for igniting the evolution of the remarkable other-
regarding abilities of the genus Homo.
Like the origins of cooperative behavior, so, too, do its
later development and evolution continue to intrigue and
stimulate new research across social and natural sciences
[12–16]. Although key mechanisms have been identified
that promote the evolution of cooperation [17], there is still
disagreement between theory and experiment on many key
issues. Two examples have recently attracted notable
interest. The first concerns network reciprocity [18–21],
according to which cooperators are able to exploit the
structure of interaction networks to offset inherent evolu-
tionary disadvantages over defectors. Recent large-scale
human experiments, however, fail to provide evidence in
support of network reciprocity [22]. The second example is
of direct relevance for the present work and concerns the
strong reciprocity model [23–26]. The latter model postu-
lates that positive and negative reciprocity are directly
correlated. In theory, it indeed seems reasonable to assume
that rewarding cooperative behavior and punishing unfair
behavior are two sides of the same preference for fairness.
Yet, recently gathered empirical data suggest otherwise
[27,28]. In fact, Yamagishi et al. [27] have performed a
series of experiments and concluded that there is no corre-
lation between the tendencies to reject unfair offers in the
ultimatum game [29] and the tendencies to exhibit proso-
cial behavior in other games [30,31]. Moreover, the analy-
sis of private household data from the Socio-Economic
Panel of the German Institute for Economics Research
presented by Egloff et al. [28] has revealed that positive
and negative reciprocity vary independently of each other,
thus providing a severe challenge to the strong reciprocity
model of the evolution of human cooperation. While
the rejection of unfair offers, which ought to be seen as
equivalent to punishing defection [32], is simply a tacit
strategy for avoiding the imposition of an inferior
status, the act of cooperating appears to have an altogether
different motivational background.
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The described disagreement between the strong
reciprocity model and empirical data invites an interdis-
ciplinary approach, which promises to shed light on the
subject from a different perspective. In the present paper,
we therefore apply evolutionary game theory [33–37]
and methods of statistical physics [38,39] to determine
whether there are evolutionary advantages to be gained
by adopting a strategy that punishes defectors as well as
rewards cooperators, as opposed to doing just one or the
other. While the elementary strategies of rewarding and
punishment have received ample attention in the recent
past [40–45], little is known about their combined effec-
tiveness. To amend this knowledge gap, we propose and
study a modified spatial public goods game [46,47],
where defectors compete with cooperators that punish
defectors, reward other cooperators, as well as do both.
We intentionally leave out cooperators that neither re-
ward nor punish in order to avoid the second-order free-
riding problem [48,49] and to thus be able to focus
solely on the effectiveness of the combined strategy
against the three elementary strategies of defection, re-
warding, and punishment.
As we will show in what follows, although the spatio-
temporal dynamics of the evolutionary game is very
complex and interesting from the physics point of
view, there exist only narrow and realistically unlikely
parameter regions where the combined strategy is able to
survive. Given the lack of notable evolutionary advan-
tages of correlating positive and negative reciprocity, the
outcome of the experiments by Yamagishi et al. [27] and
Egloff et al. [28] can thus be better understood, although
the complexity of solutions also lends some support to
the strong reciprocity hypothesis as being viable at least
under certain special circumstances. We will present
compelling evidence to support these conclusions in
Sec. III, while in the next section, we first describe the
studied spatial public goods game and the methods in
more detail.
II. PUBLIC GOODS GAME WITH POSITIVE
AND NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY
As a frequently used paradigm of social conflicts and
human cooperation, the public goods game is staged on a
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions where
L2 players are arranged into overlapping groups of size
G ¼ 5 such that everyone is connected to itsG 1 nearest
neighbors. Accordingly, each individual belongs to
g ¼ 1; . . . ; G different groups. The square lattice is the
simplest of networks that allows us to go beyond the
unrealistic well-mixed population assumption, and as
such, it allows us to take into account the fact that the
interactions among humans are inherently structured rather
than random. By using the square lattice, we also continue
a long-standing history that began with the work of Nowak
and May [18], who were the first to show that the most
striking differences in the outcome of an evolutionary
game emerge when the assumption of a well-mixed
population is abandoned for the usage of a structured
population. Many have since followed the same practice
[46,50,51] (for a review, see Ref. [14]), and there exists
ample evidence in support of the claim that, especially for
games that are governed by group interactions [47,52],
using the square lattice suffices to reveal all the feasible
evolutionary outcomes, and also that these outcomes are
qualitatively independent of the interaction structure.
Initially, each player on site x is designated either as a
defector (sx ¼ D), a cooperator that punishes defectors
(sx ¼ P), a cooperator that rewards other cooperators
(sx ¼ R), or a cooperator that both punishes defectors
as well as rewards other cooperators (sx ¼ B) with equal
probability. All three cooperative strategies (P, R, and B)
contribute a fixed amount (here considered to be equal to
1 without loss of generality) to the public good, while
defectors contribute nothing. The sum of all contribu-
tions in each group is multiplied by the synergy factor r,
and the resulting public goods are distributed equally
among all the group members, irrespective of their strat-
egies. In addition, a defector suffers a fine =ðG 1Þ
from each punisher (P or B) within the interaction
neighborhood, which in turn requires the punisher to
bear the cost =ðG 1Þ on each defecting individual
in the group. A defector thus suffers the maximal fine
 if it is surrounded solely by punishers, while a lonely
punisher bears the largest cost  if it is surrounded
solely by defectors. Similarly, every cooperator is given
the reward =ðG 1Þ from every R and B player within
the group, while each of them has to bear the cost
of rewarding =ðG 1Þ for every cooperator that is
rewarded. As a technical comment, we note that the
application of payoffs normalized by G 1 enables
relevant comparisons with the evolutionary outcomes
on other interaction networks where players might differ
in their degree and group size. Moreover, we use an
equally strong fine and reward at the same cost, techni-
cally the same pair of ð;Þ values for reward and
punishment, which ensures a fair evaluation of the evo-
lutionary advantage of both strategies. Decoupling these
parameters, for example, by administering high fines and
low rewards at the same cost to both punishers and those
that reward, would confer an unfair advantage to punish-
ment because it would then be relatively less costly than
rewarding. Since giving equal chances for success is of
paramount importance for assessing evolutionary viabil-
ity, we do not decouple  and  for reward and punish-
ment, and we also award limitless resources to all
competing strategies.
In agreement with the described rules of the game, the
payoff values of the four competing strategies obtained
from each group g are thus
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gD ¼ rðNP þ NR þ NBÞ=G ðNP þ NBÞ=ðG 1Þ;
gP ¼ rðNP þ NR þ NB þ 1Þ=G ND=ðG 1Þ þ ðNR þ NBÞ=ðG 1Þ;
gR ¼ rðNP þ NR þ NB þ 1Þ=G ðNP þ NR þ NBÞ=ðG 1Þ þ ðNR þ NBÞ=ðG 1Þ;
gB ¼ rðNP þ NR þ NB þ 1Þ=G þ ðNR þ NBÞ=ðG 1Þ;
where Nsx denotes the number of other players with strat-
egy sx in the group.
Monte Carlo simulations of the public goods game are
carried out comprising the following elementary steps.
A randomly selected player x plays the public goods
game with its G 1 partners as a member of all the
g ¼ 1; . . . ; G groups, whereby its overall payoff sx is
thus the sum of all the payoffs gsx acquired in each
individual group. Next, player x chooses one of its
nearest neighbors at random, and the chosen coplayer
y also acquires its payoff sy in the same way. Finally,
player x enforces its strategy sx onto player y with a
probability given by the Fermi function wðsx ! syÞ ¼
1=f1þ exp½ðsy sxÞ=Kg, where K ¼ 0:5 quantifies
the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [47], implying
that the strategies of better-performing players are
readily adopted, although it is not impossible to adopt
the strategy of a player that performs worse. Such errors
in decision making can be attributed to mistakes and
external influences that adversely affect the evaluation of
the opponent. Each Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a
chance for every player to enforce its strategy onto one
of its neighbors once, on average.
The average fractions of defectors (D), cooperators
that punish (P), cooperators that reward (R), and coop-
erators that do both (B) on the square lattice are deter-
mined in the stationary state after a sufficiently long
relaxation time. Depending on the actual conditions
(proximity to phase transition points and the typical size
of emerging spatial patterns), the linear system size is
varied from L ¼ 400 to 7200 and the relaxation time is
varied from 104 to 105 MCS to ensure that the statistical
error is comparable with the line thickness in the figures.
We note that the random initial state may not necessarily
yield a relaxation to the most stable solution of the game
even at such a large system size (L ¼ 7200). To verify the
stability of different solutions, we have therefore applied
prepared initial states (see Fig. 10 in Ref. [53]) and we
have followed the same procedure as described previously
in Ref. [54]. Next, we proceed with presenting the main
results.
III. RESULTS
Systematic Monte Carlo simulations are performed to
reveal phase diagrams for two representative values of
the synergy factor r. In the absence of reward and
punishment, cooperators survive only if r > 3:74, and
they are able to defeat defectors completely for r > 5:49
[47]. Taking these thresholds as benchmark values, we
focus on r ¼ 4:5 and r ¼ 2:5. For r ¼ 4:5, cooperators
are able to coexist with defectors without support from
additional strategies, solely on the basis of network
reciprocity. This value of r thus yields lenient conditions
for the evolution of public cooperation. For r ¼ 2:5, on
the other hand, cooperators are unable to survive in the
absence of reward and punishment. This value of r thus
yields adverse conditions for cooperative behavior to
prevail. For both values of r, we determine the stationary
fractions of strategies when varying the reward or fine 
and the cost . The transition points and the type of
phase transitions are identified from Monte Carlo data
collected with a sufficiently high accuracy (and fre-
quency) in the close vicinity of the transition points.
Finally, the phase boundaries, separating different stable
solutions, are plotted in the full   phase diagrams.
The obtained quantitative results are discussed in detail
in the following two subsections.
A. Synergy factor r¼ 4:5
The phase diagram depicted in Fig. 1 suggests that at
such a high value of r, the far more effective action to
outperform defectors is punishment rather than rewarding.
The pure (or absorbing because the applied dynamical rule
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FIG. 1. Full   phase diagram, as obtained for r ¼ 4:5.
Solid red lines denote continuous phase transitions. If defectors
die out, strategies R and B become equivalent (see the main text
for details), hence the ðRBÞ notation in the lower right corner of
the parameter plane. The vertical resolution hides the intricate
structure of the phase diagram for very low values of , which
we therefore show separately in Fig. 2.
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leaves the phase unchanged once the system arrives there)
D phase in the upper left corner of the   plane first
gives way to the mixed Dþ P phase and subsequently to
the pure P phase as the fine (cost) increases (decreases).
Only if the cost is negligible and the fine or reward is large
are rewarding strategies able to survive. In this case,
defectors die out very soon, and from there on, strategies
R and B become equivalent since there is nobody left to
punish. For the same reason, strategy P transforms to that
of ordinary cooperation. Accordingly, strategies R and B
are able to coexist alongside strategy P as long as the cost
of rewarding is sufficiently small enough to offset the
second-order free riding (because P does not contribute
to rewarding other cooperators). The phase is denoted
appropriately as Pþ ðRBÞ in the lower right corner of
Fig. 1.
Yet, Fig. 1 fails to convey the full story behind
the depicted phase diagram. For very low values of 
(approximately 103 smaller than ), the studied spatial
public goods game reveals its true potential to yield rich
dynamical behavior that gives rise to a truly intricate phase
diagram. As can be observed in Fig. 2, no fewer than seven
successive phase transitions can occur upon varying a
single parameter (increasing  at a fixed value of ). In
addition to the pure P phase, we can observe two-strategy
Dþ P, Dþ B, and Pþ ðRBÞ (note that here, R and B are
equivalent strategies) phases, three-strategy Dþ Pþ B
and Dþ Pþ R phases, and even the four-strategy Dþ
Pþ Rþ B phase. While the majority of phase transitions
is continuous, the Dþ P ! Dþ B phase transition is
discontinuous because of an indirect territorial compe-
tition (see Refs. [55,56] for further examples of this
phenomenon) between strategies P and B. The two com-
pete independently against the defectors, and the victor
is determined by whoever is more effective. The nature of
the other phase transitions is illustrated quantitatively in
Fig. 3, which shows a cross section across  for the most
interesting value of .
Despite the complexity of solutions, the relevance of
the presented results for the main question addressed in
this study is quickly revealed. The dashed blue line in
Fig. 2, marking the discontinuous Dþ P ! Dþ B phase
transition, conveys directly that the combined strategy B
is more effective than the elementary strategy P only if 
increases [if conditions for rewarding and sanctioning
become more lenient (the two actions become less
costly)], and this shift in effectiveness happens only
when the costs are already negligible (approximately
103 smaller than the administered rewards and fines).
Accordingly, we conclude that, at least for high values
of the synergy factor r, there are no notable evolutionary
advantages associated with correlating positive (reward-
ing) and negative (punishment) reciprocity in a single
strategy. This conclusion agrees with the empirical data
presented by Yamagishi et al. [27] and Egloff et al. [28],
who failed to observe the same correlation in human
experiments. On the other hand, it should not be over-
looked that the combined strategy B is viable and that it
does convey some advantages (albeit in very narrow and
rather unrealistic parameter regions), which thus also
lends some support to the strong reciprocity model [24].
To demonstrate just how the combined strategy B may
survive, we show in Fig. 4 a series of snapshots from a
prepared initial state (applied solely to allow the usage of a
relatively small system size), which eventually evolves
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FIG. 3. Cross section of the phase diagram depicted in
Fig. 2, as obtained for  ¼ 0:0007. Depicted are stationary
fractions of the four competing strategies in dependence on .
Stable solutions are denoted along the top axis. Unlike the
Dþ P! Dþ B phase transition, denoted by a dashed blue
line in Fig. 2, in this cross section, all phase transitions are
continuous.
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FIG. 2. Enlarged part of the full   phase diagram de-
picted in Fig. 1, zooming in on the very small (approximately
103 smaller than ) values of . Solid red lines denote con-
tinuous phase transitions, while the dashed blue line denotes
discontinuous phase transitions. Discontinuous phase transitions
are due to indirect territorial competition between strategies P
and B, which compete independently against the defectors. A
representative cross section of the phase diagrams is presented
in Fig. 3.
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toward the three-strategy Dþ Pþ B phase. Based on this
example, it could be argued that adopting strategy B does
in fact confer an advantage over strategy R, which suc-
cumbs to the evolutionary pressure stemming from the
three surviving strategies. However, as can be observed
at a glance from the depicted phase diagrams presented in
Figs. 1 and 2, the evolutionary advantage of strategy B over
strategy R is limited to a very narrow and specific parame-
ter range, which is practically invisible at normal resolu-
tion (see Fig. 1). In addition, we emphasize that strategy B
is slightly less effective than strategy P (see Fig. 3 for the
stationary fractions of the two strategies). Thus, although
the combined strategy B might appear as a good choice in
some of the parameter regions within Fig. 2, it is still
second to the elementary strategy P that adopts solely
punishment.
B. Synergy factor r ¼ 2:5
If the conditions for the evolution of public coopera-
tion become harsh, as is the case for r ¼ 2:5, the
relations between the competing strategies change quite
significantly. The phase diagram presented in Fig. 5 re-
veals that, besides the expected extension of the pure D
phase, the parameter region where strategy B can survive
also becomes larger. Furthermore, there is a significant
change in the nature of phase transitions. Unlike at r ¼
4:5 (see Fig. 1), here discontinuous phase transitions
dominate, which has to do with the spontaneous emer-
gence of cyclic dominance [57–60] between strategies
D, P, and B. In particular, within the three-strategy Dþ
Pþ B phase, strategy D outperforms strategy P, strategy
P outperforms strategy B, while strategy B again outper-
forms strategy D. It is important to note that at r ¼ 4:5,
the stability of neither the three-strategy phases nor the
four-strategy phase has been due to cyclic dominance.
Instead, as Fig. 4 illustrates, there the stability was
warranted by the stable coexistence of the strategies,
rather than by oscillations that are brought about by
cyclic dominance.
As was frequently the case before [53,54,61,62], here,
too, the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance
FIG. 4. Snapshots of the square lattice, showing a characteristic evolution from a prepared initial state, as obtained for
 ¼ 0:0015,  ¼ 0:1, and r ¼ 4:5. Strategies D, P, R, and B are depicted in red, green, dark blue, and light blue, respectively.
(The same colors are used in Fig. 3.) Time runs from the top left panel toward the bottom right panel at 0, 100, 210, 300, 1130, and
8700 Monte Carlo steps, respectively. At 0 MCS, the game is initiated from a prepared initial state (the upper left domain is a
mixture of strategies P, R, and B) to allow the usage of a very small system size (L ¼ 150) that still allows us to infer strategy
configurations in sufficient detail. At 100 MCS, D (red) percolates slightly into green, light blue, and dark blue clusters, indicating
that all three cooperative strategies could form a two-strategy phase with defectors. At 210 MCS, the borders of the three
mentioned two-strategy phases (Dþ P, Dþ R, and Dþ B) meet, and at 300 MCS, it can be observed that strategy B (light blue) is
capable of invading into the Dþ P phase while strategy R is unable to do the same. While R and B are neutral in the absence of D,
in direct competition against D, strategy B is more effective and thus continues to crowd out strategy R, as can be inferred at
1130 MCS. Interestingly, strategy P has a small advantage over strategy B because strategy P can spare the cost of rewarding. Yet,
this advantage is sufficient for P to survive in the bulk of strategy B. The last panel, taken at 8700 MCS, depicts a typical stationary
pattern where strategies D, P, and B coexist to form the Dþ Pþ B phase.
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brings with it fascinating dynamical processes that are
driven by pattern formation, by means of which the phase
may terminate. Figures 6 and 7 feature two characteristic
cross sections of the phase diagram presented in Fig. 5,
which reveal two qualitatively very different ways for the
Dþ Pþ B cyclic dominance phase to give way to the
DðBÞ phase. [Here, DðBÞ indicates that either a pure D or
a pure B phase can be the final state if starting from random
initial conditions.] The process depicted in Fig. 6 is
relatively straightforward. Here, the average fractions of
strategies P and B decay because of the increasing cost
, which ultimately results in the vanishing average value
of the fraction of strategy P. The closed cycle of domi-
nance is therefore interrupted, and the Dþ Pþ B phase
terminates.
The situation for  ¼ 0:55 is much more peculiar and
interesting. As results presented in Fig. 7 demonstrate, here
the average values of all three strategies remain finite.
Hence, the termination of the Dþ Pþ B phase must
have a different origin than at  ¼ 0:37 presented in
Fig. 6. In fact, for  ¼ 0:55, it is the amplitude of
oscillations that increases with increasing values of .
And, it is the increase in the amplitude that ultimately
results in a uniform absorbing phase regardless of the
system size. At this point, it is crucial to emphasize that
the increase of the amplitude of oscillation is not a finite-
size effect. Although, in spatial systems with cyclic domi-
nance, it is typical to observe oscillations with increasingly
smaller amplitude as the system size is increased, this
decrease in amplitude does not occur in the present case.
To demonstrate the lack of decreasing amplitude as the
system increases, we measure the fluctuations in the sta-
tionary state according to
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FIG. 7. Cross section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 5,
as obtained for  ¼ 0:55. Depicted are stationary fractions of the
four competing strategies in dependence on . Stable solutions
are denoted along the top axis. Unlike in Fig. 6, here the Dþ
Pþ B ! DðBÞ phase transition is discontinuous because the
amplitude of oscillations diverges independently of the system
size (see Fig. 8 for details) as  increases.
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FIG. 5. Full   phase diagram, as obtained for r ¼ 2:5.
Solid red lines denote continuous phase transitions, while dashed
blue lines denote discontinuous phase transitions. More pre-
cisely, the dashed blue line between phasesD andDðBÞ indicates
that there would be a discontinuous phase transition if only D
and B strategies were initially present in the system. (In other
words, the frontier of dominance between strategies D and B is
delineated.) The same holds for the dashed blue line separating
phases DðBÞ and P. The three-strategy Dþ Pþ B phase is
separated with a dotted blue line to emphasize that there are
two very different ways in which this solution can give way to
the DðBÞ phase. In particular, at smaller fines, the transition is
continuous because the average fraction of strategy P gradually
decays to zero (see Fig. 6 for a quantitative insight). At larger
fines, however, the averages of all three strategies remain finite,
but the amplitude of oscillations diverges regardless of the
system size (see Fig. 8 for details), which ultimately results in
an abrupt termination of cyclic dominance between the three
strategies (see Fig. 7). The notation of the Pþ ðRBÞ phase at the
lower right corner of the phase diagram has the same meaning as
described in the caption of Fig. 1.
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FIG. 6. Cross section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 5,
as obtained for  ¼ 0:37. Depicted are stationary fractions of
the four competing strategies in dependence on . Stable solu-
tions are denoted along the top axis. In this cross section, the
Dþ Pþ B ! DðBÞ phase transition is continuous because the
average fraction of strategy P gradually decays to zero as 
increases.
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 ¼ L
2
M
XM
ti¼1
h½DðtiÞ  D2i; (1)
where D is the average value of the fraction of defectors.
(A similar quantity can be calculated for the other strategies
as well.) As Fig. 8 shows, the scaled quantity  is
size independent, thus indicating a divergent fluctuation
as  approaches the critical value. The three-strategy
Dþ Pþ B phase is therefore unable to exist beyond this
value, despite the fact that the average fractions of all three
strategies are far from zero. Instead, the phase terminates
via a discontinuous phase transition toward theDðBÞ phase,
as depicted in Fig. 5. Notably, within theDðBÞ phase, either
the pure D or the pure B phase can be the final state,
depending on which strategy dies out first.
With this analysis, however, we have not yet covered
all the details of the phase diagram presented in Fig. 5.
In addition, there are, namely, the same pure P and two-
strategy Pþ ðRBÞ phases observable that we have al-
ready reported above for r ¼ 4:5 (see Fig. 1), only at
r ¼ 2:5, they are shifted further toward higher values of
. This shift is understandable, given that the lesser
support for public cooperation due to a lower value of
the synergy factor needs to be offset by higher fines and
rewards. Moreover, we must not overlook the existence,
albeit a very subtle one, of the two-strategy Dþ B
phase, the emergence of which is quantitatively de-
scribed in the cross section presented in Fig. 9. The
Dþ P phase is the only stable solution where the com-
bined strategy B coexists with defectors and where thus
the correlation of negative and positive reciprocity truly
outperforms elementary strategies P and R. As in all the
previously outlined cases, however, in this case, too, this
advantage is minute and limited to a very narrow region
in the phase diagram.
In general, the harsher conditions for the evolution of
public cooperation lend more support for the combined
strategy to survive, as indeed the regions on the  
parameter plane where B can prevail become quite ex-
tensive at smaller values of the synergy factor r. This
expansion of the B phase extends the credibility of the
strong reciprocity model, and it indicates that, if they
manifest at all, the evolutionary advantages of correlated
positive and negative reciprocity ought to manifest more
clearly under extreme adversity. In future experiments, it
may thus be worthwhile to work toward such conditions
if the goal is to possibly discern some more actual
advantages of correlated reciprocities and thus to further
support the assumptions of the strong reciprocity theory
with empirical data. A warning to end the presentation of
results is, however, in order. As the series of final snap-
shots presented in Fig. 10 clearly demonstrates (and to
no lesser extent also the series of snapshots presented in
Fig. 4), conditions for pattern formation and complex
strategic configurations need to be given for the subtle
solutions, here identified by means of extensive and
systematic Monte Carlo simulations, to emerge and be
stable. Such conditions appear to be very difficult to
achieve in experiments with humans, which is why
efforts toward large-scale implementations, as recently
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FIG. 9. Cross section of the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 5,
as obtained for  ¼ 0:05. Depicted are stationary fractions of the
four competing strategies in dependence on . Stable solutions
are denoted along the top axis. In this cross section, the pure D
phase first gives way to a very narrow interval where the
two-strategy Dþ B phase precedes the spontaneous emergence
of cyclic dominance between strategies D, P, and B. The last
(from left to right) Dþ Pþ B ! P phase transition is qualita-
tively similar to the Dþ Pþ B ! DðBÞ phase transition de-
picted in Fig. 6, only here it is the fraction of strategy B that
decays to zero as  increases, and which thus interrupts the
closed cycle of dominance. (In Fig. 6, it is the fraction of strategy
P as  increases that has the same effect.)
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FIG. 8. Fluctuations of the amplitude of oscillations  in
dependence on the vicinity to the critical value of the cost
c ¼ 0:1242ð6Þ for  ¼ 0:55 and different system sizes, as
indicated in the legend. The slope of the power-law exponent
(solid line) is 1, indicating divergent fluctuation as  approaches
the critical value.
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reported in Refs. [22,63], are very encouraging and
certainly worth developing further in the future.
IV. DISCUSSION
Our goal in the present paper was to determine whether
there are evolutionary advantages associated with correlat-
ing positive and negative reciprocity in a single strategy, as
opposed to adopting solely reward or punishment as an
elementary strategy. Systematic Monte Carlo simulations
have revealed that, regardless of the synergy factor
governing the public goods game, elementary strategies,
and punishment in particular, are, in general, significantly
more effective in deterring defection than the combined
strategy. Although there exist narrow and rather unrealistic
parameter regions where the correlation of positive and
negative reciprocity can outperform a particular elemen-
tary strategy, these advantages are highly unlikely to play a
role in human experiments, and they also frequently come
second to the evolutionary success that is warranted
by punishment alone under the same conditions. The pre-
sented results thus lend support to the empirical data
published in Refs. [27,28], which fail to support the central
assumption of the strong reciprocity model that negative
and positive reciprocity are correlated.
The studied four-strategy spatial public goods game
gives rise to fascinating evolutionary outcomes that are
separated by continuous and discontinuous phase transi-
tions. We have demonstrated, for example, that indirect
territorial competition may lend some credibility to the
combined strategy, as the latter is sometimes more effec-
tive against the defectors than solely rewarding. In special
parameter regions, the combination of positive and nega-
tive reciprocity can thus crowd out cooperators that reward
other cooperators. Under the same conditions, however,
cooperators that punish but do not reward can be more
effective still, so overall, it is difficult to argue in favor
of choosing the combined strategy over an elementary
FIG. 10. Snapshots of the square lattice, showing a characteristic evolution from a prepared initial state, as obtained for  ¼ 0:1,
 ¼ 0:55, and r ¼ 2:5. Strategies D, P, R, and B are encoded with the same color as used in Fig. 4. Time runs from the top left panel
toward the bottom right panel at 0, 100, 1800, 4100, 4240, and 4610 Monte Carlo steps, respectively. At 0 MCS, the game is initiated
from the same prepared initial state, and for the same reason, as described in the caption of Fig. 4. At 100 MCS, it can be observed that
strategies P (green) and R (dark blue) are both weaker than strategyD (red), and accordingly, their isolated islands shrink. Conversely,
the combined strategy B is more effective when competing alone against the defectors, and thus the light blue island grows. Moreover,
in the absence of defectors, strategy P can exploit rewarding strategies and spread fast in the bulk of the mixed domain (upper left
circle). It is also worth pointing out that the B domain would grow endlessly in the sea of defectors if it did not meet the elementary
strategy P that is able to exploit it. At 1800 MCS, the final solution is practically formed, and from here on, traveling waves dominate
the spatial grid. At 4100 MCS, it can be observed that strategy B can spread toward strategy D, and based on this invasion, strategy B
may control a significant portion of the lattice for a short period of time. At 4240 MCS, however, strategy P can easily invade the bulk
of the B domain, but in the absence of this domain, strategy P itself becomes vulnerable against the defectors. This cycle of dominance
is repeated from 4610 MCS onward, which is a very similar configuration as the one at 1800 MCS. Naturally, the oscillations become
more intense as we approach the edge of theDþ Pþ B phase in Fig. 5, and the evolution can easily terminate in an absorbing phase if
the system size is not sufficiently large.
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one. Moreover, stationary solutions that are governed by
indirect territorial competition terminate suddenly via dis-
continuous phase transitions, and accordingly, they are
difficult to identify and are unlikely to seriously challenge
conclusions based on empirical data.
For low synergy factors, we have shown that the
spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance between
strategies D, P, and B is also a possible solution of the
system, and indeed it significantly extends the parameter
region where the correlation of positive and negative
reciprocity is viable. Within the cyclic phase, defectors
outperform punishers, punishers outperform the combined
strategy, and the combined strategy is able to invade
defectors, thereby closing the loop of dominance. In this
case, an argument can again be made in favor of the
combined strategy over solely rewarding, but since the
remaining three strategies become spontaneously entailed
in a cycle of dominance, the advantage warranted by the
correlation of negative and positive reciprocity is indirect
and circumstantial at best. Furthermore, we have demon-
strated that the cyclic dominance can terminate in very
different ways. Either the average fraction of one strategy
vanishes, or, more intriguingly, the amplitude of oscilla-
tions diverges in a system-size-independent manner. Thus,
although the average fractions of all three strategies are
far from zero, the cyclic dominance phase may end
abruptly via a discontinuous phase transition. Although
phenomena like indirect territorial competition, cyclic
dominance, divergent fluctuations of the amplitude of
oscillations, as well as previously reported critical phe-
nomena in evolutionary games [64], self-organized adap-
tation [65,66], and in-group favoritism [67] are all of
significant interest to physicists, we emphasize that they
would likely require massive efforts to be observed in
human experiments. Nevertheless, recent large-scale at-
tempts in this direction promise exciting times ahead
[22,63].
Last, it remains to emphasize that punishment is the
elementary strategy that is definitively more effective
than the combined strategy, while rewarding is not neces-
sarily so. However, rewarding can be made much more
potent if rewards are administered not to all cooperators
but only to those who themselves reward others. In this
case, rewarding can completely outperform punishment at
low  and high  values, while the situation reverses only
if the costs become relatively high compared to the rewards
and fines. Yet, in this modified scenario, the act of punish-
ing yields no extra advantages, and in general, strategy B
can survive only when strategy R can survive, too.
Therefore, even under such altered, rewarding-friendly
conditions, there are still no notable evolutionary advan-
tages to be gained by adopting a strategy that combines
both positive and negative reciprocity. With this conclu-
sion, we hope that our study will inspire further research
aimed at investigating the role of correlated strategies in
evolutionary games, and we also hope that more experi-
mental work will be carried out to clarify their role in the
evolution of human cooperation.
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